Whispers of Canada's Kandahar Failure, and Future

Canadian forces will soon face an invasion in Kanadhar.  And its not clear, if they know quite what to do about it. 

Its the first wave of U.S. President Barack Obama's "Afghanistan Surge." Of the 21-thousand new American troops deployed, 15 thousand will be deployed to territory Canadian and British troops were tasked to secure three years ago.  This is no mistake. Few would argue the situation in Afghanistan's south is better today.

Militarily, Canada has never had the force strength to secure the vast stretches of Kandahar,  from the porous desert border with Pakistan, to village mazes of Panjwaii, to the lush orchards of the Arghandab Valley. Starting with largely soft-skinned vehicles, Canadian convoys have pushed more and more armour on to the roads  as bombs increased in number and effectiveness. It took time for old Leopard tanks to be deployed. Promised Leopard 2 tanks, worth more than one billion dollars, still sit in storage. Until just last year, troops didn't even have dedicated Canadian air support.

One solider joked that Rumsfeld said went to war the Army he had, but Canada made it it up as it went along.  

Soliders have fought bravely, even heroically.  Soldiers have died.  Combat operations have successfully swept insurgent villages.  But counterinsurgency strategy follows up  "clear", with "hold" and "build."  Success in these phases, has been decidedly mixed.

Much of Canada's "hold" strategy was built on one of Canada's strengths, the soldier-diplomacy founded in a long history of blue helmet operations. Strong relations, and trust, with the likes of Kandahar's respected Mullah Naquib kept the peace. Then Naquib died.  And warm relations with local elders and tribes have been strained as violence, and insurgent intimidation,  increased.  

Insurgents are actively targeting these local leaders.  One Kandahar source tells me at least one elder is killed each week.    Rural villages have decided stay out of the fight, helping neither Taliban, nor NATO. In Kandahar City, this month:  gunmen brazenly assassinated human rights legislator Sitera Achezai at the gates of her home, three suicide bombers struck the Governor's compound, and others hit the Provincial Council Building while the Chairman, Hamid Karzai's brother,  was inside.  

Diplomats tell me the building of local security forces has been frustrating. Last year, organized well-trained Taliban stormed the Kanadhar Prison, freeing insurgents, breaking community confidence, and waking up western complacency. While police now take the brunt off all deaths in afghanistan, pay remains low (but improving). Corruption is notorious. 

The extent of corruption in Kandahar's reconstruction is rumoured, but yet to be revealed. Accountability for hundred of millions dollars in aid projects is far from transparent.  But beyond that, there are questions about Canada's decision to focus on the 50 million dollar, signature, Dahla Dam and irrigation project, while poverty and insecurity drive discontent.

One Kandahari, now in Kabul, told me he's glad Canada's repairing the Dam. He's also happy America built the airport, and the Russians built hospitals, and the Taliban built mosques.  And he's starting to see a pattern.

Now to be clear: all this is criticism, not outright failure. 

But there is enough concern to send in the Cavalry, in force, in the form of America's mobile armoured Stryker Brigade.  They'll take over border patrol in Spin Boldak, and be deployed in Arghandab, Shah Wali Kot and Khakrez; all districts familiar with Canadian combat operation.  Some 10-thousand Marines will arrive within weeks, to be deployed through Helmand, an area of British operations. 

So far, most concern has focused on the new rules of engagement U.S. forces will observe. Much has been made of the kinder gentler NATO approach, and worries that fire-first cowboys will cause unnecessary civilian deaths and inflame local, growing, anger with foreign presence.  

Less has been said about the fact that 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force being deployed has long experience in Helmand,  even bettering NATO by ordering Pashto language courses as part of the preparations.  The Stryker Bridge has taken a staple of the Canadian forces, the LAV-III light armoured vehicle, and utilized it to secure Mosul and Baqouba in Iraq. 

In short there are lessons both NATO and American forces can learn, from their own unique experiences.    As Canadian Forces move into the last years of this mission, it is an opportunity that should not be lost.

Whispers of failure too easily become fact by infighting. Long after western forces leave,  southern Afghanistan would be left with the consequences, once again.  

Follow up: A Canwest story moved just hours after posting, Canada concedes hard-won territory to Taliban reflects the on-the-ground reality in Panjwaii, the focus of much of Canada's counter-insurgency efforts .

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